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Scope of Statutory Appeal and Access to Justice 
 
Greenpeace Ltd, Petitioners 
 
[2020] CSOH 88 
 
The scope of a statutory appeal procedure was given a broad interpretation to ensure that 
important aspects of the decision to give consent to an offshore oil-field development could be 
subject to effective legal challenge.  In view of the existence of this alternative means of challenge, it 
was, however, not appropriate to allow the challenge here to proceed under the standard judicial 
review procedure. 
 
Background  
 
Before drilling for oil can begin, consent from the Oil and Gas Authority must be obtained, with the 
agreement of the Secretary of State.  As part of the procedure, the Secretary of State must carry out 
an environmental impact assessment.  The Oil and Gas Authority has a limited remit in deciding 
whether to give consent so that environmental issues are considered only by the Secretary of State 
in deciding whether or not to agree to consent being granted.  
 
In earlier proceedings in England, it had been accepted by the Secretary of State that the relevant 
regulations, the Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipe-lines (Assessment of 
Environmental Effects) Regulations 1999 SI 1999/360, failed to implement fully the EU Directive on 
such assessments.  Consultation was under way on the introduction of amendments to ensure that 
the Regulations would comply. 
 
The issue here was whether leave should be granted for judicial review seeking a declarator that the 
Regulations did not properly implement the Directive and the quashing of the Secretary of State’s 
agreement to consent being granted for drilling in the Vorlich Field in the North Sea. 
 
Arguments and decision 
 
Judicial review is only possible where there is no satisfactory alternative procedure available to 
contest the decision in question.  In the first place it was argued that since the provisions creating a 
specific procedure for challenging a grant of consent referred only to non-compliance with the 
Regulations, there was no scope for using that procedure to raise issues relating to compliance with 
the Directive’s requirements.  Lord Boyd dismissed this argument.  Insofar as the Regulations failed 
to implement the Directive, the Directive had direct effect and could be relied on. 
 
Secondly it was argued that since the legislation providing for a statutory challenge referred only to 
the consent, that statutory procedure could not be used to raise issues relating to the Secretary of 
State’s consideration whether or not to agree to the grant of consent.  Again, this argument was 
dismissed.  The agreement and consent should be seen as one integrated process, not two distinct 
procedures.   
 
This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that if it was only the consent that could be challenged 
under the Regulations, the route for challenging the Secretary of State’s decision (the only stage at 
which environmental issues are considered) would be limited to judicial review.  Yet the standard 
three-month time-limit for raising a judicial review might well have expired before the Authority 
reached its final decision on consent.  The absence of an effective means of challenge, Lord Boyd 
said, would be a serious lacuna and probably a breach of the obligations in relation to access to 
justice under the Aarhus Convention.  
 
Outcome and Comment 
 
Leave to proceed with the judicial review was refused since there was an alternative statutory 
procedure available. The practical outcome of this case, however, is rather messy since a parallel 
statutory challenge was in fact already under way.  Moreover, it was held that the main substantive 
issues were moot given that it had been accepted that the Regulations did not comply with EU law 
and steps were already being taken to correct that position.  Argument over whether or not the 
proposed amendments went far enough were said to be for the political arena, not the courts. 
 
Of wider interest, perhaps, are Lord Boyd’s comments on access to justice and seeking to ensure 
that there is a meaningful way to challenge important decisions.  In past years, one might have 
expected a narrow, legalistic interpretation of such statutory provisions.  That the court was 
prepared to consider the broader picture, shows an increased regard for access to justice and the 
importance of the rule of law (although the result here was to deny judicial review).  Indeed the 
reference to the Aarhus Convention and the indication of certain issues as belonging within political 
processes further the impression of a welcome willingness to have regard to governance 
arrangements in the broader context.  
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